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4, JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
35-1-86 Utah Code 1987-1988. 
5. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jacobsen1s occupational disease claim (R.8) was denied 
by Salt Lake County and a hearing was held before 
Administrative Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion. Judge Sumsion 
sought and received medical opinions from Jacobsen1s treating 
physician (R.55-56), a medical panel (R.82-83), and a third 
physician (R.100-101) before he made his findings and order, 
(R.116-124). Jacobsen objected to the findings and order 
(R.125-131) and filed a motion for review. The Industrial 
Commission denied Jacobsen1s motion to review (R.144-145) and 
affirmed Sumsion's order. Jacobsen then filed a petition for 
review with this court. (R.147). 
6. THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was there sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the finding of the Industrial Commission that only one-third of 
Jacobsen1s pulmonary impairment was compensable as an 
occupational disease claim? 
7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: This is an occupational 
disease claim by a former fire fighter of Salt Lake County. 
Jacobsen and Salt Lake County agree that he has a 30% permanent 
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partial impairment. The dispute is over allocating the 30% 
between pre-existing and occupational causes as required by 
Utah Code 1987-1988, Section 35-2-50. The Industrial 
Commission found 1/3 of the 30% was occupational and 2/3 
pre-existing. Jacobsen believes all of the 30% is occupational 
and that the Industrial Commission's order was not supported by 
the findings. 
B. Course of Proceedings; The Industrial Commission 
affirmed the order of the administrative law judge which found 
Salt Lake County responsible for 1/3 of Jacobsenfs pulmonary 
impairment. Jacobsen alleges that Salt Lake County is liable 
for 100% of his impairment and filed a writ of review alleging 
the findings do not support the Industrial Commission's award. 
C. Disposition at Industrial Commission: The 
Industrial Commission affirmed the findings and order of the 
administrative law judge and ruled that only 1/3 of Jacobsen1s 
pulmonary impairment was the responsibility of Salt Lake County. 
D. Relevant Facts with Citations to the Record: 
1. Jacobsen was employed with Salt Lake County as a 
fire fighter from February 1971 until April 1986. (R.18). 
2. Jacobsen took a medical retirement in May 1986 at 
age 40 (R.19) and is receiving 50% of his regular salary. 
(R.32). 
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3. Jacobsen obtained two letters from physicians (R.2 
and R.3) stating that continued service as a fire fighter might 
endanger his well-being. 
4. Jacobsen1s first problems came with allergic 
reaction to cats in private residences when on calls as a 
paramedic. (R.23). 
5. Jacobsen first sought treatment from Dr. Abaunga 
in 1979 or 1980 and later was referred to Dr. Renzetti in 1982. 
(R.26). 
6. Jacobsen doesn't believe he could perform the 
duties of fire fighter or paramedic because of his health. 
(R.27-28). 
7. Jacobsen1s medical diagnosis is bronchial asthma. 
(R.29, 47). 
8. Dr. Renzetti (R.47) and Dr. Bronsky (R.141) rated 
Jacobsen as having a 30% impairment of the whole man. 
9. Jacobsen filed an occupational disease claim 
against Salt Lake County on May 26, 1986. (R.8). Salt Lake 
County denied the claim June 26, 1986. (R.9-10). 
10. A hearing on Jacobsen1s claim was held on August 
12, 1986 before Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
Jacobsen was represented by Byron Fisher, attorney at law. 
(R.16) . 
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11. On August 25, 1986, Judge Sumsion wrote to 
Jacobsen's treating physician, Dr. Renzetti, and asked: "If it 
is your opinion that at least some portion of Mr. Jacobsen's 
pulmonary impairment is attributable to his job as a fire 
fighter with Salt Lake County, I need to have some breakdown as 
to the industrial component contrasted to non-industrial 
pre-existing conditions." (R.53). 
12. Dr. Renzetti responded to Judge Sumsion1s question 
in a letter dated August 28, 1986. (R.55-56). 
First, in the case of Mr. Jacobsen, I know 
of no cause and effect relationship between 
his bronchial asthma and his occupation as a 
fire fighter. Although it is known that 
asthma may be caused by exposure to specific 
chemicals, I know of no such specific 
exposure in his case. In addition, I 
believe it is important to point out that 
Mr. Jacobsen is an allergic individual with 
a family of history of asthma (I also take 
care of his mother, who is an asthmatic). 
As you pointed out, individuals who suffer 
from bronchial asthma will have an 
exacerbation from exposure to smoke or other 
inhaled agents. I consider this an 
exacerbation of an underlying condition as 
opposed to a cause and effect relationship. 
13. On November 7, 1986, Judge Sumsion appointed Edwin 
Bronsky, M.D. to serve as the medical panel. 
14. The medical panel's report (R.84-85) stated: 
I agree with the sentiments of Doctor 
Renzetti in his letter of September 17, 1986 
to Judge Sumsion that it was impossible to 
attribute his asthma to any specific 
chemicals and, on the other hand, could not 
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rule out the possibility that asthma was 
induced by specific chemical contact in the 
course of his fire fighting. It has been 
well established in the literature that 
contact with isocyanates and other chemicals 
can induce asthma and that repeated exposure 
to these chemicals could set up a continuing 
and even permanent disability after the 
exposure has been terminated if that 
exposure has been long and intense enough to 
set up the original and continuing reaction. 
• * * 
I have suggested that Mr. Jacobsen contact 
Doctor Jordan Fink, an expert in occupational 
asthma at the University of Wisconsin at 
Milwaukee. It is possible that this expert, 
one of several in the country, could 
actually test him for isocyanates or other 
chemicals to determine the extent of their 
participation in his asthma. 
15. Jacobsen never went to Dr. Fink, as suggested b_ 
the medical panel, to determine if smoke did participate in his 
asthma, but rather corresponded with him by mail. 
1'6. Dr. Fink gave his opinion (R.100-101) without 
having obtained a personal health history directly from 
Jacobsen or having examined Jacobsen. He based his opinion 
upon medical research jthat Jacobsen performed and sent to Fink 
and upon medical information Jacobsen supplied. Dr. Fink 
concluded: 
In reviewing your records, I am of the 
opinion that you have had allergic 
respiratory disease with asthma related to 
cat dander sensitivity. However, during the 
time of those symptoms, you were also 
exposed to smoke and noxious materials in 
your occupation. It is unlikely that cat 
induced asthma would progress to steroid 
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dependent asthma (you have not indicated 
whether or not you have had a cat at home 
during that time) and you were exposed on a 
regular basis in your occupation to 
materials which can induce hyperactive 
airways and progressive pulmonary function 
deterioration.% 
I, therefore, am of the opinion that your 
progressive pulmonary impairment was induced 
by your recurrent exposure and inhalation of 
smoke and noxious materials in your 
occupation. While it is likely that your 
asthma was also initially induced by cat 
exposure, I believe it would not have 
progressed to disability had you not been a 
firefighter. Further, although it cannot be 
determined with certainty, the early 
inhalation of smoke etc. may just as likely 
damaged your airways so that your 
sensitivity to cat and subsequent asthma was 
brought out clinically. 
17. Judge Sumsion made his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R.116-124) and determined: 
Without regard to cause, Dr. Renzetti rated 
the applicant's pulmonary impairment at 30% 
of the whole man. This included his under-
lying chronic pulmonary disease consisting 
of the bronchial asthma, extensive cystic 
changes and coccidiodomycosis. Viewing the 
evidence in its entirety, the Administrative 
Law Judge finds that most if not all of the 
applicant's pulmonary impairment is not the 
result of any occupational disease even 
though his duties as a fire fighter may weLl 
have aggravated the underlying condition to 
some extent. This being the case, the 
provisions of Section 35-2-50 are 
applicable. Section 50 provides that: 
" . . . Where disability or death from any 
other cause not itself compensable is 
aggravated, prolonged, accelerated or any 
wise contributed by an occupational disease, 
the compensation payable under this act 
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shall be reduced and limited to such 
proportion only of the compensation that 
would be payable if the occupational disease 
were the sole cause of the disability or 
death, as such occupational disease as a 
causative factor bears to all the causes of 
such disability or death." As noted above, 
Dr. "Renzetti found no medical or scientific 
justification for attributing any of the 
applicant's impairment to an occupational 
disease. On the other hand, all of the 
doctors who have examined the applicant or 
who have examined his records have 
acknowledged the possibility of an 
aggravation of his pulmonary disorder as a 
result o*f his fire fighting activities. For 
lack of any objective criteria on which to 
do so, the Administrative Law Judge is 
willing to arbitrarily assume that 10% or 
1/3 of the applicant's impairment is 
reasonably attributable to the aggravation 
of the applicant's underlying pulmonary 
disorder as a result of his fire fighting 
activities. 
* * * 
In awarding benefits herein, the 
Administrative Law Judge believes there is 
sufficient compentent medical evidence for 
making the award but allows for the fact 
that such evidence is at best controversial 
and that the percentage of impairment deemed 
industrial is clearly arbitrary. However, 
there appears to be no way to make an 
allocation of the partial impairment on a 
medical or scientific basis, hence the 
arbitrary allocation. 
18. Jacobsen objected to Judge Sumsion's findings and 
order. (R.125-131). 
19. The Industrial Commission denied Jacobsen1s 
objection in its Order Denying Motion for Review (R.144-146), 
where it stated: 
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On January 28, 1988f the applicant filed a 
Motion for Review contesting the award of 
only one third of the permanent partial 
impairment rated. The applicant argues he 
is entitled to the full 30% because had he 
never been exposed to the smoke in his 
occupation, he would never have had to 
medically retire. The applicant's 
entitlement to the full impairment rated is 
the only issue on review. The Commission 
finds that the applicant's argument on 
review would be a logical one if the issue 
were disability. Unfortunately, the statute 
(U'.C.A. 35-2-50) specifically states that 
only that impairment resulting from 
occupational aggravation to a pre-existing 
disease can be compensated. The medical 
evidence is quite clear that the only 
contribution the occupational exposure to 
smoke had to the impairment was in the form 
of aggravation to an already developed 
bronchial asthma caused by alleTgy. 
Therefore, the full 30% is not occupational 
in origin and cannot be compensated in 
full. As such, the applicant's Motion for 
Review must be denied and the Administrative 
Law Judge's January 11, 1988 Order affirmed. 
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was credible medical evidence presented that 
indicated none of Jacobsen's pulmonary impairment was work 
related. Jacobsen's treating physician, Dr. Renzetti, stated 
it frankly: "It is my opinion that Mr. Jacobsen's pulmonary 
impairment is only attributable to his underlying bronchial 
asthma and I cannot with any-medical or scientific 
justification attribute any portion of it to an 'industrial 
component.'" (R.55). Notwithstanding Dr. Renzetti's opinion, 
Judge Sumsion found 1/3 of Jacobsen's impairment compensable, 
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but in doing so he admitted there wasn't much evidence to 
support any award to Jacobsen. He stated: "In awarding 
benefits herein, the Administrative Law Judge believes there is 
sufficient compentent medical evidence for making the award but 
allows for the fact that such evidence is at best controversial 
and that the percentage of impairment deemed industrial is 
clearly arbitrary." (R.122). 
Jacobsen is fortunate that the administrative law 
judge saw fit to award him anything on his occupational disease 
claim. 
9. DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
The record contains the opinions of three physicians: 
(1) Dr. Renzetti, Professor of Medicine and Head of the 
Division of Respiratory and Occupational Pulmonary Medicine, 
University of Utah; (2) Dr. Bronsky, Intermountain Allergy and 
Asthma Clinic, Salt Lake City; and Dr. Fink, Professor of 
Medicine and Chief of the Allergy-Immunology Section, Medical 
College of Wisconsin. Only Drs. Renzetti and Bronsky actually 
examined Jacobsen. Dr. Fink never saw Jacobsen and rendered 
his opinion based upon information sent to him by Jacobsen that 
is not part of the record. 
The opinions of the three physicians were not totally 
consistent. Dr. Renzetti opined that none of Jacobsen1s impair-
ment was attributable to an industrial component. (R.55). 
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Dr. Bronsky stated it was impossible to attribute Jacobsen's 
asthma to any specific chemicals, but "could not rule the 
possibility" that his asthma was induced by chemicals he 
contacted while fighting fires. (R.85). Dr. Fink concluded: 
"While it is likely that your asthma was also initially induced 
by cat exposure, I believe it would not have progressed to 
disability had you not been a fire fighter." (R.101). 
Judge Sumsion reviewed all of the evidence and decided 
that one-third of Jacobsen's impairment was related to his fire 
fighting. Without a clear consensus from the physicians, Judge 
Sumsion decided: "For lack of any objective criteria on which 
to do so, the Administrative Law Judge is willing to arbitrarily 
assume that 10% or 1/3 of the applicant's impairment is 
reasonably attributable to the aggravation of the applicant's 
underlying pulmonary disorder as a result of his fire fighting 
activities." (R.121). Judge Sumsion's allocation is certainly 
within the range of medical opinions offered by Drs. Renzetti, 
Bronsky and Fink. 
The standard of review of an Industrial Commission 
order is set forth in Pinter Construction Company v. Frisby, 
679 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984), at page 307: 
In reviewing an Industrial Commission order, 
this Court may only set aside an order if 
(1) "the commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers" or (2) "the findings 
of fact do not support the award." U.C.A., 
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1953, Section 35-1-84. We must sustain 
an order unless it is unsupported by any 
substantial credible evidence and is 
therefore arbitrary and capricious. 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 
567 P.2d 153 (1977); Rustler Lodge v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 562 P.2d 
227 (1977); Harry L. Young & Sons v. 
Ashton, Utah 538 P.2d 316 (1975); 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 
1020 (1961). Furthermore, as to 
questions of mixed law and fact, the 
Court "will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency as long as the 
commission's interpretation has 'warrant 
in the record' and a reasonable basis in 
the law." Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Department of Employment Security, Utah, 
657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (1982) . 
•Judge Sumsion's eight pages of findings and 
conclusions (R.116-123) represent a detailed review of the 
factsf in the record upon which the Industrial Commission based 
its order. Judge Sumsion did show some concern in his decision 
about the adequacy of the. record to support his findings, but 
strangely enough, it was not the deficiency Jacobsen urges upon 
this court. Judge Sumsion labeled the evidence supporting the 
award of benefits as "at best controversial". But his concern 
was whether there was a basis in fact to give Jacobsen any 
award at all. (R.122). 
10. CONCLUSION 
The issue on appeal is whether or not the findings of 
fact support the award of the Industrial Commission. This 
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court must sustain the order unless it is unsupported by any 
substantial credible evidence. The opinions of the physicians 
provide opinion evidence to support the commission's findings 
that some, but not all, of Jacobsen's pulmonary impairment was 
compensable. 
DATED this T day of August, 1988. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Deputy—et^unty Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Salt Lake County 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Judge Sumsionfs Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law *and Order. 
B. The Industrial Commission of Utah's Order 
affirming Judge Sumsion's order. 
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, Utah 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Industrial Commission, 160 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 12, 1987 at 1:00 
o'clock p.m. Said hearing was pursuant to order and notice 
of the Industrial Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant was present and represented by Byron Fisher, 
Attorney at Law. Mr. Fisher subsequently withdrew and the 
applicant is now represented by L. Zane Gill, Attorney at 
Law. 
The Defendants were represented by Jay Stone, Deputy County 
Attorney. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the medical questions and issues 
were submitted to a special medical panel appointed by the Administrative Law 
Judge. The medical panel report was received by the Commission and copies 
were distributed to all of the parties. No significant objections to the 
medical panel report were filed although the applicant did file a Motion for 
appointment of an additional doctor to the medical panel after the original 
report* had been submitted seeking to have Dr. Jordan Fink appointed as a 
member of the panel. Dr. Fink is Chief of the Allergy-Immunology Section at 
the Medical College of Wisconsin and is a recognized expert in his field. The 
Administrative Law Judge granted an extension of time for the submission of 
Dr. Fink's opinion relative to Mr. Jacobsen*s claim but denied the Motion 
seeking his appointment as a member of the medical panel. 
Applicant requested that the hearing be reopened to allow 
consideration of additional evidence and information that was not inquired 
into at the time of the hearing. As an alternative procedure, counsel for the 
applicant suggested that Mr. Jacobsen be allowed to supplement his testimony 
ROBERT JACOBSEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PAGE TWO 
by way of affidavit subject to counter affidavit and/or cross-examinations 
through a deposition. The later procedure was approved and the affidavit of 
the applicant was filed on September 14, 1987. A copy of the affidavit was 
submitted to counsel for the defendant on September 18, 1987 and Mr. Stone 
responded by letter dated October 8, 1987 indicating he was prepared to submit 
the matter without cross-examining the applicant or presenting evidence in 
conflict with that already contained in the record. Mr. Stone also submitted 
a letter from Salt Lake County Fire Chief, Larry C. Hinman regarding the 
affidavit of Mr. Jacobsen but did so by way of explanation rather than counter 
affidavit acknowledging the letter was not sworn to. With the file in this 
position, the parties have deemed the matter submitted and have advised the 
Administrative Law Judge that they would await a decision in this matter. 
The issues to be decided in this case are as follows: 
1. Does the applicant have an occupational disease compensable 
under the provisions of Section 35-2-27(28)? 
2. If so, did the applicant comply with all of the filing 
requirements of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law? 
3. If so, does the applicant have a rateable permanent partial 
disability? 
4. If so, what compensation is the applicant entitled to under 
Section 35-2-56? 
5. If compensation is payable, is the award subject to a 
proportional offset under the provisions of Section 35-2-50? 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant was employed by the Salt Lake County Fire Department 
from 1971 to 1986. The first years of his employment were served as a fire 
fighter. In the late 1970*s the applicant started to develop respiratory 
symptoms prompting him to seek medical attention. Between April of 1979 and 
September of 1981 the applicant was under the care of Dr. Alfred Albunza, a 
specialist in pulmonary medicine. From and after November 1 of 1982, the 
applicant continued under the care of Dr. Attillio D. Renzetti, Jr., Professor 
of Medicine and Chief of the Division of Respiratory, Critical Care and 
Occupational (Pulmonary) Medicine at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
As a result of Dr. Renzetti*s recommendations, the applicant obtained a 
ROBERT JACOBSEN 
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position with the Fire Department as an investigator so as to be removed from 
the possibility of smoke inhalation during fire fighting. Dr. Renzetti was 
and is of the opinion that the applicant was suffering from bronchial asthma 
to a severe degree and that if he continued to be exposed to smoke from a fire 
he would run the risk of developing severe and potentially life threatening 
asthmatic attacks. It is Dr. Renzetti*s opinion that Mr. Jacobsen*s pulmonary 
impairment is only attributable to his underlying bronchial asthma and he is 
unable to attribute any portion of it to an industrial component with any 
medical or scientific justification. This opinion is expressed in Dr. 
Renzetti*s letter addressed to the the Administrative Law Judge dated August 
28, 1986. In the same letter, Dr. Renzetti states: "I do not know who advised 
Mr. Jacobsen that his pulmonary problem "might have been occupationally 
caused.** I certainly did not advise him such but in fact informed him that 
his asthma could not be attributed in a causal fashion to his fire fighting 
but rather that fire fighting would lead to exacerbation of his disease. I 
think it is important to point out that such exacerbations due to exposure to 
smoke would be temporary and amenable to therapy. Perhaps he had 
misinterpreted my remarks in this regard. It is clear from Dr. Renzetti*s 
reports that bronchial asthma is not an occupational disease so far as the 
cause of the disease is concerned. It is equally clear that asthma is 
severely aggravated by smoke inhalation necessitating the removal of the 
applicant from work which involves exposure to smoke from fires. Dr. Renzetti 
saw no problem in the applicant's continued employment in an administrative 
position for the Fire Department which did not subject him to exposure to the 
smoke of fire fighting. 
The applicant was given a medical retirement effective May 1, 1986. 
The reason given was that even though he was then employed in an 
administrative position that he was clearly physically capable of performing, 
he nevertheless was required to step in as a fire fighter if called to do so. 
Because his asthma condition prevented him from considering the possibility, 
he was dismissed from the force by an involuntary medical retirement. The 
dismissal of the applicant from the Fire Department is not a matter which is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Workers Compensation Division. In this 
regard, the Administrative Law Judge can only comment and observe that the 
reason given for the applicant*s termination and medical retirement seems 
totally contrary to common sense and would appear to be a flimsy explanation 
for some undisclosed underlying reason. 
The Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law places upon any claimant 
a difficult burden of proof. Rarely can a given exposure be duplicated with 
any degree of certainty at a subsequent time. It seems only common sense that 
certain allowances must necessarily be made in order to effectuate the 
purposes of the Occupational Disease law. The applicant has attempted to 
document his exposure as accurately as possible by the submission of the 
affidavit referred to above. With certain minor exceptions identified by the 
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letter from Fire Chief Larry Hinman, the bulk of the applicant's affidavit 
would appear to reflect the best evidence available relative to the 
applicant's exposure as a Fire Fighter0 Accordingly, with the exceptions 
noted, the Administrative Law Judge adopts the affidavit of the applicant by 
reference as his own findings of fact as though fully set forth. In doing so, 
the Administrative Law Judge recognizes that some of these* f afcts are mere 
impressions or opinions without any appreciable degree of objectivity and this 
directly relates to the weight and sufficiency of such evidence when used to 
support the applicant's claim for compensation. 
The Administrative Law Judge appointed Dr. Edwin A. Bronsky to 
perform an impartial evaluation of the medical aspects of this case. Dr. 
Bronsky was appointed primarily upon the recommendations of Dr. Renzetti who 
suggested that a specialist in the treatment of allergies might be best 
qualified to evaluate this case and he said that Dr. Bronsky was a recognized 
expert in this field in this community. Dr. Bronsky had never served in this 
capacity before and this resulted in a few irregularities with respect to his 
evaluation of the applicant. The first irregularity was by way of undertaking 
a certain amount of treatment of Mr. Jacobsen as contrasted to an evaluation. 
When Mr. Jacobsen was first seen by Dr. Bronsky he was quite ill and this 
necessitated the prescription of many medications before certain tests could 
be performed. Finally, Dr. Bronsky was able to adequately test the applicant 
in December of 1986. Dr. Bronsky states, 
"He was tested for a panel of allergens and was found to be 
essentially a non-allergic individual except for a 
significant reaction to cat dander. This testing in 
general did not confirm that he had significant allergic 
diathesis which would have contributed to his asthma. The 
cat reaction cannot be considered relevant as the 
underlying cause for his asthma and its continuing problem 
I have suggested that Mr. Jacobsen contact Dr. Jordan Fink, 
an expert in occupational asthma at the University of 
Wisconsin at Milwaukee. It is possible that this expert, 
one of several in the country, could actually test him for 
isocyanates or other chemicals to determine the extent of 
their participation in his asthma. I agree with the 
sentiment of Dr. Renzetti . . . that it was impossible to 
attribute his asthma to any specific chemicals and, on the 
other hand, could not rule out the possibility that asthma 
was induced by specific chemical contact in the course of 
his fire fighting. It has been well established in the 
literature that contact with isocyanates and other 
chemicals can induce asthma and that repeated exposure to 
these chemicals could set up a continuing and even 
permanent disability after the exposure has been terminated 
if that exposure has been long and intense enough to set up 
the original and continuing reaction.*' 
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Dr. Fink was contacted by the applicant and he recommended that a med 
line search be undertaken to obtain literature on the subject of the effects 
of smoke and toxic gases etc. on the respiratory tract. Applicant did this 
and submitted copies of a number of articles by various experts in the field. 
The applicant provided Dr. Fink with certain background information and Dr. 
Fink expressed his opinion in a letter addressed to the applicant dated August 
14, 1987. He states in the conclusion: 
The experience of physicians in our institution is that 
some fire fighters may develop persistent hyperactive 
airways disease following smoke inhalation. 
In reviewing your records, I am of the opinion that you 
have had allergic respiratory disease with asthma related 
to cat dander sensitivity. However, during the time of 
those symptoms, you were also exposed to smoke and noxious 
materials in your occupation. It is unlikely that cat 
induced asthma would progress to steroid dependent asthma 
(you have not indicated whether or not you have had a cat 
at home during that time) .and you were exposed on a regular 
basis in your occupation to materials which can induce 
hyperactive airways and progressive pulmonary function 
deterioration. 
I, therefore, am of the opinion that your progressive 
pulmonary impairment was induced by your recurrent exposure 
and inhalation of smoke and noxious materials in your 
occupation. While it is likely that your asthma was also 
initially induced by cat exposure, I believe it would not 
have progressed to disability had you not been a fire 
fighter. Further, although it cannot be determined with 
certainty, the early inhalation of smoke etc. may just as 
likely damage your airways so that your sensitivity to cat 
and subsequent asthma was brought out clinically." 
The Administrative Law Judge has difficulty in adopting the findings of Dr. 
Fink as his own because of the many assumptions of fact which cannot be 
objectively documented. One must first accept the assumptions that many of 
the fires fought by the applicant involved the inhalation of smoke, toxic 
gases, isocyanates, etc. that caused the applicant's bronchial asthma. Dr. 
Renzetti, on the other hand, could find no medical or scientific justification 
to attribute the cause of the bronchial asthma to the applicant's employment 
even though the asthma itself was clearly aggravated by the applicant's 
industrial exposures. Of some significance is Dr. Renzetti's statement that 
the applicant's mother has also been a patient of his and she is also 
asthmatic. 
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Without regard to cause, Dr. Renzetti rated the applicant's pulmonary 
impairment at 30% of the whole man. This included his underlying chronic 
pulmonary disease consisting of the bronchial asthma, extensive cystic changes 
and coccidiodomycosis. Viewing the evidence in its entirety, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds ^  that most if not all of the applicant's 
pulmonary impairment is not the result of any occupational disease even though 
his duties as a fire fighter may well have aggravated the underlying condition 
to some extent. This being the case, the provisions of Section 35-2-50 are 
applicable. Section 50 provides that: ". . . Where disability or death from 
any other cause not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated 
or any wise contributed by an occupational disease, the compensation payable 
under this act shall be reduced and limited to such proportion only of the 
compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole 
cause of the disability or death, as such occupational disease as a causative 
factor bears to all the causes of such disability or death." As noted above, 
Dr. Renzetti found no medical or scientific justification for attributing any 
of the applicant's impairment to an occupational disease. On the other hand, 
all of the doctors who have examined the applicant or who have examined his 
records have acknowledged the possibility of an aggravation of his pulmonary 
disorder as a result of his fire fighting activities. For lack of any 
objective criteria on which* to do so, the Administrative Law Judge is willing 
to arbitrarily assume that 10% or 1/3 of the applicant's impairment is 
reasonably attributable to the aggravation of the applicant's underlying 
pulmonary disorder as a result of his fire fighting activities. 
Section 35-2-56 mandates as a condition for the payment of benefits 
for permanent partial disability that: "(b) No compensation shall be paid 
unless such partial disability results within two years prior to the day upon 
which claim for such compensation was filed with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. (c) No compensation shall be paid unless the partial disability results 
within two years of the last day in which the employee was exposed to the 
occupational disease.•• The applicant filed his claim with the Commission on 
May 15, 1986 and subsequently filed an amended claim on May 21, 1986. He took 
sick leave from April 25, 1986 through May 31, 1986 but the record does not 
disclose if he was disabled during that period of time. Furthermore, the 
record does not disclose the last day on which the employee was last exposed 
to the occupational disease. Presumably, in this context, the statute in 
referring to exposure to the occupational disease is referring to the last 
harmful exposure which in this case would be the applicant's fire fighting 
activities in which he was exposed to smoke, toxic gases or isocyanates. 
Applicant makes reference in his affidavit to having been exposed to heavy 
smoke on July 14, 1980. He makes reference to another fire in South Salt Lake 
which presumably was subsequent to the July 14, 1980 fire inasmuch as it 
appears subsequent in his affidavit. Although there is room for doubt, 
presumably, the applicant has met the filing requirements of the law. 
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Compensation payable to the applicant under the foregoing assumptions 
is governed by Subsection (4) of 35-2-56. Compensation is determined by 
multiplying the percentage of partial permanent disability resulting from the 
occupational disease by 104 weeks times the employee's compensation rate per 
week. The maximum rate of compensation at the time of the applicant's 
disablement was $215.00 per* week. Therefore, compensation is computed based 
on the following formula: .10 X $215.00 X 104 weeks = $2,236.00. Because the 
compensation does not exceed 20 weeks, it is payable in a lump sum. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
In awarding some benefits in this case, the Administrative Law Judge 
is aware of the Supreme Court's recent decision in the case of Tisco 
Intermountain v. the Industrial Commission filed September 29, 1987 No. 20913 
in which the Court stated: 
"Policy considerations in workers compensation cases 
dictate that statutes should be liberally construed in 
favor of an award. However, policy considerations have no 
application in the absence of any evidence to support an 
award, nor can they*be used to controvert the clear meaning 
of the statutory requirements upon which an award must be 
based. 
In the instant case, it clearly appears that the award of 
benefits is unsupported by substantial credible evidence, 
and that is the standard this Court must apply. In 
awarding benefits, the Administrative Law Judge also 
ignored compentent medical evidence that negatives the 
finding of medical causation." 
In awarding benefits herein, the Administrative Law Judge believes 
there is sufficient compentent medical evidence for making the award but 
allows for the fact that such evidence is at best controversial and that the 
percentage of impairment deemed industrial is clearly arbitrary. However, 
there appears to be no way to make an allocation of the partial impairment on 
a medical or scientific basis, hence the arbitrary allocation. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant Salt Lake County Fire 
Department pay to Robert Jacobsen the sum of $2,236.00 as permanent partial 
ROBERT JACOBSEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PAGE EIGHT 
disability of 10% of the whole person attributable to aggravation or 
exacerbation of his underlying pulmonary disorder, the aggravation or 
exacerbation thereof being attributable to his fire fighting activities while 
employed by the Salt Lake County Fire Department. This amount shall be 
payable in a lump sum, less attorney1 s fees, plus interest at the rate of 8% 
per annum from and- after May 1, 1986, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salt Lake County Fire Department pay one 
third of the applicants medical expenses attributable to his pulmonary 
disorder; these expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. The remaining two thirds which is 
presumed attributable to the underlying non-occupational pulmonary disease, is 
payable by the applicant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant Salt Lake County Fire 
Department pay to L. Zane Gill, applicant's attorney, the sum of $447.20. No 
portion of the fee is awarded to applicant's prior attorney, Byron Fisher, 
because of the very limited fee awarded in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (IS) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of January 11, 1988. 
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Linda J.j'Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On January 11, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case permanent partial impairment benefits. 
The benefits were compensation for an aggravation of the applicant's 
pre-existing bronchial impairment caused by occupational exposure to smoke. 
The exposure to smoke occurred from 1971 to 1986 during which time the 
applicant was employed as a firefighter with Salt Lake County. The applicant 
was assessed by his treating physician, Dr. Renzetti, as having a 30% whole 
person impairment due to his bronchial asthma. Per the Administrative Law 
Judge's Order, this impairment rating takes into consideration both the 
applicant's pre-existing bronchial asthma resulting from an allergy to cat 
dander, as well as the aggravation to his asthma caused by his occupational 
exposure to smoke. 
Based on U.C.A. 35-2-50, the Administrative Law Judge determined it 
was necessary to award permanent partial impairment benefits solely on that 
impairment that was caused by the occupational exposure. Neither the medical 
panel, nor the two other doctors who had given their opinion regarding the 
causal aspects of the applicant's impairment, expressed numerically the 
breakdown between the pre-existing cause and the occupational cause of the 
impairment. In fact, all the expert medical opinions offered are purposefully 
inconclusive regarding exactly how much the applicant's occupational exposure 
contributed to his overall lung impairment. Therefore, the Administrative Law 
Judge estimated the amount of impairment caused by the aggravation as being 
one third of the overall impairment rated and based on U.C.A. 35-2-50 awarded 
permanent partial impairment benefits based on a 10% permanent partial 
impairment. 
On January 28, 1988, the applicant filed a Motion for Review 
contesting the award of only one third of the permanent partial impairment 
rated. The applicant argues he is entitled to the full 30% because had he 
never been exposed to the smoke in his occupation, he would never have had to 
medically retire. The applicant's entitlement to the full impairment rated is 
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the only issue on review. Th3P*CttWaisaion finds ttmt the applicant's argument 
on i w i ^ would fce^i Idgr<*ir oSirrrT3i^lssue were^disabimyr Unfortunately, 
the statuteT^Wt^rAl ^ 3S-2~50>spec i f ica l l^^stag^^that only that impairment 
tXfWto&mJte?* occx*!*^^ disease can be 
compensated. The medical evidence i s quite clear that the only contribution 
the occupational exposure to smoke had to the impairment was in the form of 
aggravation to an already developed bronchial asthma caused by allergy. 
Therefore, "t&e 1^11^30* ~T^ *n origin and cannot be 
compensated in fu l l . As 3ucht the applicant's Motion for Review must be 
denied and the Administrative Law Judge's January 11, 1988 Order affirmed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's January 28, 1988 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's January 11, 1988 Order 
is hereby affirmed and final with further review to the Court of Appeals only 
within the thirty (30) day time limit as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman T 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
John Florez 
Commissioner 
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